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Abstract: Common practice in the housing and wealth distribution literature has proceeded as if the 
modeling of housing rental markets was unnecessary due to renters’ relative low levels of wealth and the 
small fraction they represent in the total population. This paper shows, however, that their inclusion 
matters substantially when dealing with wealth concentration over the life cycle. Renters are concentrated 
in the poorer and younger groups. This concentration results in a pattern of housing wealth concentration 
over an agent’s life that is decreasing, with a slope as steep as that of nonhousing (or financial) wealth. 
The author constructs an overlapping-generations economy with a housing rental market that is consistent 
with this fact. 
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1 Introduction
The comparison between the characteristics of the wealth distribution that results from
equilibrium models and its properties in US data has been the subject of an extensive
literature in macroeconomics. Aside from a few exceptions, housing wealth has rarely
been modeled explicitly but has been lumped together with other assets in the “capital”
stock, following the tradition of one-sector stochastic growth models. Even when housing
has been separated from other assets (such as in D´ ıaz and Luengo-Prado (2003) or Gru-
ber and Martin (2003)) the existence of a real estate rental market has been completely
ignored. While it is true that renters are a minority in the total population, they rep-
resent an overwhelming majority among the poorer and younger age groups. As I show
below, their inclusion in dynamic macroeconomic models has important implications for
the wealth concentration over the life cycle: Gini coeﬃcients for housing wealth are de-
creasing with age, with a slope almost as large as that of ﬁnancial wealth. Previous work
(Silos (2005)) has shown that the Gini coeﬃcients of housing wealth when economies do
not allow for renting housing services display little variation over the life cycle.
The modeling strategy is close to Huggett (1996), introducing some of the elements
that he considers necessary for models to succeed in matching wealth distribution mo-
ments, but separating housing from the remaining capital stock and allowing agents to
consume housing services through renting. It is an overlapping generations economy in
which agents are subject to idiosyncratic income risk and death uncertainty. Income is
taxed and the proceeds ﬁnance a pay-as-you-go Social Security system which provides
pensions for retired workers.
In addition to the already mentioned work by D´ ıaz and Luengo-Prado (2003) and
Gruber and Martin (2003) in which they introduce durable goods into Aiyagari’s (1994)
model, there are two related studies that are worth mentioning for their close relation
1to the research presented here. The ﬁrst is an article by Gervais (2002) on which the
modeling of the housing rental market in this paper builds. He presents a deterministic
economy in which agents have the choice of renting housing services or owning real estate
capital, and analyzes the welfare implications of diﬀerent taxation schemes. The second
is a manuscript by Platania and Schlagenhauf (2000). They construct a life-cycle model
where agents are subject to idiosyncratic risk and study the asset allocation problem be-
tween business capital and housing. These agents also have the choice between renting
housing services in a rental market and owning housing capital. In their model, individu-
als are constrained to hold a ﬁxed amount of housing and it is therefore inappropriate to
study wealth distribution, or even portfolio choice, issues.
2 The Model
The economy consists of a continuum of agents with a total measure of one that live for
at most I periods. Agents are born with zero wealth, and work during the ﬁrst T periods
of their lives. Retirement is mandatory at the end of period T and people live oﬀ their
accumulated wealth for the remaining I − T periods.
Individuals maximize their expected lifetime utility over non-housing consumption (c)






In the previous expression, the time-discount factor is denoted by β 1.
1All generations discount the future at the same rate. The model with uncertain lifetimes is presented
below.
22.1 Social Security
The government runs a “pay-as-you-go” system that taxes the younger generations (work-
ers) and partly subsidizes consumption and investment expenditures of the older genera-
tions. The retirement beneﬁts (b) consist of a fraction (replacement rate) φ of the average
wage.
2.2 Technology
There is an aggregate technology operated by a representative ﬁrm that produces output
in this economy using capital K and labor N:
Y = F(K,N) (2)
This production function satisﬁes the usual properties, increasing in both arguments,
strictly concave and homogeneous of degree one. Output can be costlessly allocated to
consumption, business capital investment and investment in residential capital.
The technology for transforming residential capital (h) into housing services (s) is
linear: si = hi, where si is the amount of services enjoyed by an age-i individual. These
services can be obtained by either owning residential capital or by renting them in a
housing rental market. Both renting and owning are mutually exclusive. In an attempt
to mimic ﬁscal policy in several developed nations, homeownership is “subsidized” in
the form of deductible mortgage interest rate payments. Hence, in the absence of any
additional friction agents would rather own than rent. However, housing capital is not
perfectly divisible: if an agent wants to own she needs to buy a house of at least size h.
If she can not aﬀord it, she must enjoy housing services by renting. The ﬁnancing of a
home purchase is done by entering in to a one period mortgage. Agents are only allowed
to borrow at most a fraction 1 − γ of the value of the new home. Hence, we can think of
γ representing the downpayment fraction. There is no diﬀerence in depreciation between
3rented capital and owned capital, with all housing capital depreciating at a rate of δh.
Agents supply inelastically whatever amount of time they are endowed with. However,
they are subject to productivity shocks that alter their level of eﬃciency. The structure
of ﬁnancial markets is such that agents can not trade directly contingent claims to hedge
against shocks to labor productivity and the smoothing of income ﬂuctuations is done by
adjusting the holdings of capital and residential stocks.
2.3 The Agent’s Problem
Aside from the usual choices of allocating consumption and savings, and allocating total
investment between residential and business capital, agents have to decide whether they
want to rent housing services or they want to own residential capital stock. As usual, to
ﬁnance both types of consumption, individuals obtain income by inelastically supplying
one unit of labor and from renting capital.
Denote by Vi(k,hχO,ξ) the value function of an agent belonging to generation i that
enters the current period. The state variables for this optimization problem are the level
of capital holdings (k), the previous housing status described by the indicator variable χO
and the house holdings h (in case she was a home owner), and the value of the productivity
shock in the previous period (ξ). The consumer will compare the value of becoming a
renter versus the value of purchasing a home. Denote these two values by V R and V O





















c + ps + a
′ ≤ (1 + r(1 − τ))a + y + (1 − δh)χOh (5)
and
a
′ ≥ 0 (6)
The functional equation (4) states that agents choose housing services, consumption
and asset holdings to maximize lifetime utility. They take into account that they will
enter next period with zero housing wealth and having rented in the present, hence the
value of zero for χO. Equation 5 is the budget constraint. The sum of expenditures
on consumption, rented housing services and investment cannot exceed the sum of cap-
ital income, labor income and depreciated real estate capital. Analogously, the value of






















′ ≥ −(1 − γ)h
′ (10)
h
′ ≥ h (11)
Sources of income other than from asset holdings are denoted by y, which equals b,
the pension beneﬁts, if the agent is retired and (1 − τ)we(i)ξ if the agent is of working
age. Notation is standard. Prime variables denote next period values, w is the wage,
and e(age) is an age-speciﬁc eﬃciency factor. Expectations are taken with respect to the
distribution of the productivity values ξ, denoted by Φ. The borrowing constraint (10) for
the homeowners’ problem is a downpayment constraint: the agent can not borrow more
5than a fraction equal to (1−γ) of the house she wants to buy. In addition, the indivisibility
constraint (11) states that any house the individual buys must have a minimum size of h.
2.4 The Rental Market
The rental market is run by a rental agency/ﬁnancial institution. In addition, this rental
agency also takes deposits from investors and loans assets in the form of mortgages to
potential homeowners. I have followed Gervais (2001) in modeling the banks/rental agen-
cies as two-period lived institutions. Their problem is relatively simple. Depositors hold
assets and obtain an interest rate of r. Using these deposits, banks loan money (also at
a rate r) to home buyers, and buy residential capital. This residential capital is in turn
rented to individuals at a price p per unit. At the end of the second period they sell the





























where Hb is the rented stock, Db are deposits, Bb are loans and Sb are housing services
provided through this rental agency. For this maximization problem to be well deﬁned
the following no-arbitrage condition needs to hold:
p = r + δh (15)
In words, this condition implies that faced with having one unit of resources to spend,
an individual can take two diﬀerent actions: the ﬁrst, buy residential capital and rent it,
paying a maintenance cost of δh and obtaining a revenue equal to p; and the second, open
a deposit in the bank and obtaining a net revenue of r. These two actions must yield the
6same proﬁt. This condition will guarantee that banks/rental agencies will be making zero
proﬁts in equilibrium.
2.5 Equilibrium
Denote by z the triple (a,h,ξ) and by  t the measure of agents of age t. A stationary
equilibrium is a set of decision rules for consumption c(z,t), ﬁnancial asset holdings a(z,t),
real estate holdings h(z,t) and housing services rented x(z,t), prices w,r, age-dependent
distributions across wealth and income levels Ψ1,...,ΨI, a tax rate τ, level of beneﬁts b,
and aggregate quantities K,N,Db,Hb such that:
1. Decision rules are optimal.
2. Prices are determined competitively:
r = F1(K,N) − δk (16)
w = F2(K,N) (17)
















a(z,t)dΨt − K (19)
















(c(z,t) + δhh(z,t))dΨt + δkK + δhH
b (21)
6. The government balances its budget in every period.
7The equilibrium deﬁnition is standard and most equations are straightforward. However,
two equations deserve further explanation: the capital market clearing condition (18) and
the rental market clearing condition (20). To compute aggregate capital K the stock of
rented residential capital needs to be subtracted from the total amount of ﬁnancial assets
held by individuals. Notice that a can be negative therefore it includes the amount agents
borrow from banks. The rental market clearing condition just states that the amount of
residential stock owned by ﬁnancial institutions Hb needs to be equal to the amount of
services rented by individuals.
3 Parameterization
3.1 Demographics
The model period is set to be equivalent to 5 years. Agents are assumed to be born being
21 years old. Individuals live for I = 12 periods (60 years), and retire after 9 periods.
3.2 Social Security
The level of Social Security beneﬁts is determined in equilibrium after specifying a rate
taxed to workers. This rate, denoted φ is set at a value of 0.1. This number is taken from
Huggett (1996) and it is consitent with the average of contributions to social security as
a fraction of labor income, as reported in the Social Security Bulletin.
3.3 Preferences, Technology and Endowments
The utility function chosen is of the constant relative risk aversion class, standard in the






Parameters in the model were chosen to match some features of the United States
economy during the last forty years. The discount factor β was chosen to match a steady-
state interest rate of about 4% per year. This value was chosen by Fern´ andez-Villaverde
and Krueger (2002), although most likely the return to “equity” in the data is somewhat
larger. However, it is important to notice that technology in this model is riskless.
The parameter θ - the share of non-housing consumption in the utility function - was
set at 0.8. This value is consistent with housing expenditures being about 20% in the
Consumer Expenditures Survey (see Peterson (2003)). I will present results with several
values of σ, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, which in turn will imply diﬀerent
values for β.
3.3.1 The Earnings Process
When looking at the properties of the wealth distribution, it is important to have an
accurate approximation to the earnings process. Huggett (1996) estimates an AR process
for the logarithm of the labor endowment:
zt = ρzt−1 + ǫt (23)
The disturbance term ǫ is distributed normally with mean zero and variance σ2
ǫ.
Huggett sets σ2
ǫ = 0.045, with a persistence parameter chosen so that the unconditional
variance is equal to 0.38, which in turn implies a Gini coeﬃcient in earnings of 0.42. This
resulted in a value for ρ of 0.96.
For computational purposes I have approximated this process as a seven state Markov
chain. In the Appendix I present a comparison of the moments implied by the continuous
9and the discrete state processes. The transformation of the continuous state process into
its ﬁve-year equivalent was done prior to its conversion into a discrete state process.
In addition to this idiosyncratic productivity shock agents face an age-dependent ef-
ﬁciency proﬁle {ηi}I
i=1 used in Huggett and Ventura (1999) 2. Hansen (1993) estimated
median wage rates from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for diﬀerent age groups.
Huggett and Ventura used Hansen’s estimates, and set them to be the wage corresponding
to the age in the center of the group and linearly interpolated to obtain values for all ages.
A plot of this eﬃciency proﬁle is shown in Figure 1.




















Figure 1: Eﬃciency Proﬁle
3.4 Technology
Output is produced by combining capital and labor through a Cobb-Douglas production
function:




The value chosen for α was 0.30 which implies a share of labor in total income of 0.70,
roughly consistent with US data. The depreciation rates were obtained from the data
using conditions relating investment, capital and output in the steady state. For both







US data from 1964-2003 implies values for δh and δk of 4.3% and 9.4% per year. The
equivalent ﬁve-year values were δh = 1−(1−0.043)5 = 0.197 and δk = 1−(1−0.094)5 =
0.3895.
The structure of the housing market implies that in order to be a home owner, the size
of the purchase must be equal or larger than h. The value for this parameter was chosen
so that the model would deliver an aggregate homeownership rate of approximately 68%.
In the US economy a typical value for downpayment fractions of the house value at
the time of the purchase is 20% (see Fern´ andez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002)). For this
reason the borrowing constraint is speciﬁed so that agents can borrow up to 80% of the
house they want to buy: 1 − γ = 0.8.
Table 1 summarizes the parameterization for the model, stating values for parameters
and their target/source. Details about the solution of the model are included in the Ap-
pendix, but the methods are fairly standard. Once decision rules are obtained, summary
statistics are computed by simulating life-cycle paths for a large number of agents drawing
shocks from the appropriate (discretized) distribution for productivity shocks.
11Table 1: Summary of Parameter Values
Parameter / Variable σ = 1.5 σ = 2 Target / Source
β 0.976 0.9677 r=4% per year
h 0.276 0.276 Rate Owners=68%
φ 0.1 0.1 Huggett (1996)
θ 0.8 0.8 20% exp. in housing; Peterson (2003)
z — — Huggett and Ventura (1999)
e — — Huggett and Ventura (1999)
α 0.36 0.36 NIPA
δk 0.094 0.094 ”
δh 0.043 0.043 ”
1 − γ 0.8 0.8 Fern´ andez-Villaverde and Krueger (2002)
Table 2: US data (1964-2003)
Variable Average
(K + H)/GDP 3.471
K/GDP 1.754
H/GDP 1.717
K/(K + H) 0.505
H/(K + H) 0.495
HO/HR 2.96
4 Results
Table 2 shows some aggregate annual statistics3 for the United States economy during
the period 1964-20034.
The table shows the importance of housing in the aggregate economy, with residential
stocks representing half of the entire capital stock. The total capital to output ratio,
K+H
GDP , seems somewhat larger than values previously reported, for example in Cooley and
3The appendix provides deﬁnitions of all variables used throughout the paper.
4The last entry of the table corresponds to data from 1987 to 2003.
12Table 3: Model Output, Averages
Variable Model Period, σ = 1.5 Model Year, σ = 1.5
(K + H)/GDP 0.837 4.186
K/GDP 0.594 2.519
H/GDP 0.330 1.667
K/(K + H) 0.554 0.554
H/(K + H) 0.446 0.446
HO/HR 4.652 4.652
Variable Model Period, σ = 2 Model Year, σ = 2
(K + H)/GDP 0.846 4.230
K/GDP 0.508 2.539
H/GDP 0.338 1.697
K/(K + H) 0.553 0.553
H/(K + H) 0.447 0.447
HO/HR 4.673 4.673
Prescott (1995), but the deﬁnition of GDP does not include housing services. Housing
services approximately represent 10% of total output. The last cell in Table 2 gives the
ratio of the stock of residential capital that is owned to that which is rented. In the US
economy the average for this ratio is 2.96.
Table 3 gives the model’s values for some selected aggregate statistics, including those
in Table 2. To facilitate the comparison I present the results also in their yearly equiv-
alents. While the model overestimates the level of business capital accumulation (about
4.2 in the model versus 3.5 in the data), both the aggregate wealth composition and the
ratio of residential stock to output are close to their empirical counterparts. Business
capital is about 0.55 of total wealth and the residential stock is about 1.7 times GDP,
roughly what is observed in the data.
Data on households’ wealth come from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) . The
SCF has become the main source used by ﬁnancial economists to address any question
13Table 4: US Economy: Gini Coeﬃcients
Variable US Pop. 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50
Non-Housing 0.750 1.069 0.902 0.834 0.747 0.720 0.720
Primary Residence 0.645 0.857 0.739 0.687 0.646 0.612 0.580
Variable 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 71-75 76-80 —
Non-Housing 0.700 0.696 0.704 0.655 0.648 0.675 —
Primary Residence 0.612 0.583 0.599 0.606 0.535 0.559 —
related to the composition of balance sheets in US households. I have used the 2001
version in which a total of 4,400 families were interviewed. The SCF gives great detail
on the housing side of households’ asset position. It provides responses about quantities
owed from diﬀerent mortgages, HELOCs, market values of primary residence, values of
vacation homes and other real estate participations. Without a not so direct relation to
the model presented in this paper, it gives information about types of mortgages (e.g.
whether it is a mortgage from the Veterans’ administration, the Federal Housing Admin-
istration, etc...), frequency of payments, real estate taxes, number of units in the lot,
etc...
Table 4 presents data on Gini coeﬃcients for ﬁnancial assets net of housing and the
value of the primary residence for the overall population and the diﬀerent age groups.
The Gini indices for non-housing wealth over the life cycle follow a decreasing pattern (a
decreasing level of concentration), due to a large number of net borrowers in the younger
age groups. It starts with a value larger than unity for the ﬁrst age group (21-25), de-
creasing to about a value of 0.66 for the older generations. For a similar reason, the larger
concentration of renters in the younger age groups, the Gini index for the value of the
primary residence is also decreasing. Levels of concentration, however, are smaller than
for non-housing wealth. The largest coeﬃcient occurs also for the younger age group with
14a value of 0.86, decreasing to a value of about 0.55 for the older age groups. For the entire
population the Gini for non-housing wealth is is 0.10 larger than for the value of the house
(0.75 vs. 0.65). Figures 3 and 4 depict the Gini coeﬃcients for the US economy and the
model implied Gini indices for non-housing wealth and housing wealth respectively. The
model is roughly consistent with the pattern of concentration of wealth over the life cycle
for non-housing wealth, especially for the younger age groups. The Gini index for the
25-30 year-old individuals is about 0.985. It is decreasing over the ﬁrst age groups as it is
in the data, but understates the magnitude observed in the data for the agents of older
generations by an average of 0.25-0.30. In addition, for the older generations it increases
due to the larger proportion of renters, which increases the variance of housing wealth,
hence increasing the Gini index. Finally, for the last age group the Gini coeﬃcient is zero,
given that everybody is a renter and everybody holds zero housing wealth.
Finally, the model replicates the pattern of homeownership rates observed in the data.
This pattern is shown in Figure 2. In the data, the majority of renters is concentrated
in the younger age groups with a proportion of only about 19% of homeowners. The
fraction of homeowners increases steadily until age 55, remaining at a value of about 0.85
thereafter. The model replicates the lower value for the fraction of homeowners at the
younger age groups and the steady increase until age 50, ﬂuctuating about a value of 80%.
In the last generation (not plotted) the percentage of renters is 100% given the absence
of estate taxes and bequests.
4.1 Uncertain Lifetimes
In the previous section all generations discount the future at a constant rate β. However
introducing mortality risk has been shown to have an important quantitative eﬀect for the
wealth distribution (Huggett (1996)) and the well known hump in life-cycle consumption
(Feigenbaum (2005)). In this section I modify the model by introducing uncertain life-



































Figure 2: Homeownership Rates by Age Group





























Figure 3: Gini Coeﬃcients: Non-Housing Assets
times which decrease the discount factor for all agents, but proportionately more for the
older generations. The survival probabilities are obtained from the US Census Bureau.

































Figure 4: Gini Coeﬃcients: Primary Residence






In the above expression φi+1 denotes the probability of surviving to age i + 1 at the
time of birth. The other characteristics of the model remain unchanged except for the
fact that dead individuals leave accidental bequests that are distributed in a lump sum
manner to the surviving fraction of the population. These bequests or transfers, denoted
Tr, increase the level of income of individuals and therefore equations (5) and (8) now
read:
c + ps + a




′ ≤ (1 + r(1 − τ))a + y + Tr + (1 − δh)χOh (29)
17Table 5: Model Output (Uncertain Lifetimes), Averages
Variable Model Period, σ = 1.5 Model Year, σ = 1.5
(K + H)/GDP 0.969 4.849
K/GDP 0.514 2.570
H/GDP 0.456 2.280
K/(K + H) 0.489 0.489
H/(K + H) 0.511 0.511
HO/HR 5.450 5.450
Variable Model Period, σ = 2 Model Year, σ = 2
(K + H)/GDP 0.963 4.819
K/GDP 0.507 0.507
H/GDP 0.456 2.283
K/(K + H) 0.492 0.492
H/(K + H) 0.508 0.508
HO/HR 4.538 5.538
respectively for renters and homeowners. In addition, in equilibrium the aggregate trans-




 t(1 − φt+1)
Z
Z
(a(z,t) + h(z,t))dΨt (30)
The remaining parts of the equilibrium deﬁnition are identical to the ones in the previous
section.
Parameter values are identical to the previous section, with two exceptions. To achieve
an interest rate of about 4% the values for β are now 0.958 when σ = 2 and 0.964
when σ = 1.5. The other exception is the minimum house size that delivers the target
homeownership fraction, which is set at 0.3.
The performance of the model with uncertain lifetimes, regarding matching the long-
run averages in Table 2 is displayed in Table 5. The model performs worse than the one
with certain lifetimes in almost all averages with the exception of the aggregate wealth
composition. Uncertain lifetimes deliver a fraction of housing capital in the total wealth of
18about 0.49 which is roughly the value in the data. This comes at the cost of an increase in
both the total capital to GDP ratio and the residential stock to GDP ratio: their values
are now 4.8 and 2.28 respectively, farther away from the empirical counterparts shown in
Table 2. It is worth noticing that in this economy GDP is considerably smaller that in
the previous section. The reason is that aggregate employment is measured in eﬃciency
units and relative to the model with certain lifetimes, we are giving more weight to the
younger generations which are less productive. Mortality risk reduces business capital
holdings and therefore business capital to output ratios remain roughly constant across
the two models. However, housing consumption also decreases, but proportionately much
less, and that accounts for the increase in total wealth to output and housing wealth to
output ratios.
Figures 5 and 6 show the implications of the model for the level of wealth concentration
over the life cycle. Death uncertainty increases the level of indebtedness of younger
generations resulting in too large levels of wealth concentration at the initial stages of the
life cycle. The behavior after age 40 (not many borrowers in any case) is similar to the
certain death model.
Regarding housing wealth, larger amounts of housing are consumed in the ﬁrst period,
leading to an increase in the proportion of renters and decreasing the wealth concentration
with respect to the certain death case. The diﬀerence in homeownership behavior in the
ﬁrst year is apparent by comparing Figures 7 and 2.
5 Conclusion
This paper has explored the properties of the wealth distribution and asset accumulation
in a life cycle economy where housing is modeled separately from other types of assets.
One important feature of the housing market that has been introduced in this study and





























Figure 5: Gini Coeﬃcients: Non-Housing Assets

































Figure 6: Gini Coeﬃcients: Primary Residence
omitted in all other studies of the wealth distribution is the existence of a rental market for
housing services. Housing is the most important asset for most US households, but some



































Figure 7: Homeownership Rates by Age Group
of those households choose to rent housing services investing their wealth in alternative
assets. The presence of renters has implications for the life cycle concentration of wealth.
Gini coeﬃcients for housing wealth are decreasing, quite steeply, while they are rather
ﬂat for models that only consider homeowners. The model is also consistent with the
pattern of homeownership rates that are observed for diﬀerent age groups, as well as
other aggregate features of the US economy.
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236 Appendix
6.1 Computational Details
As it has become customary, the model is solved numerically, given the absence of closed
form solutions. After discretizing the earnings process and ﬁxing parameter values, I con-
structed grids for the variables of interest A = {a1,...,aNK} and H = {h1,...,h,...,hNH}.
Notice that the grid for residential stocks includes values that can not be chosen by in-
dividuals who want to own. Hence the housing variable needs to include information
about tenure status, summarized by the variable χO. Although state variables (h and a
need to be discretized, it is desirable to allow control variables (h′ and a′) to take on a
continuum of values. Housing in the utility function, however, usually creates diﬃculties,
both when either working directly through Bellman equations (optimization) or through
Euler equations (solutions of non-linear systems). In this paper, although the number of
possible values for a′ is not discrete, for housing it is. Hence given a state summarized by
the triple (a,h,χO) and for a given value of h′, the optimal a′ is found by using a golden
section search method and linear interpolation. Repeating this for all possible values of
h′ will give diﬀerent values for the expected lifetime utility for diﬀerent combinations of
a′ and h′. The individual will pick the h′ that yields the highest value. The procedure is
summarized in the following steps:
Step 1: Guess a level of aggregate capital K.
Step 2: Given interest rates and wages implied by that level of capital and the technology
assumption, solve for the policy functions for all ages, tenure status, income levels and
house and capital holdings.
Step 3: Simulate life cycle paths for consumption, investment, etc..., for a large number
of agents. Compute aggregate capital.
Step 4: If the level of capital is close to the one guessed in Step 1, an equilibrium has
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Variable Mean Variance Skewness 1st Autocorr.
zt 0.003 0.584 0.054 0.815
zt, discrete -0.009 0.523 0.003 0.773
ezt 1.349 1.562 3.871 0.787
ezt, discrete 1.284 1.052 2.220 0.730
been found. Otherwise, update capital and return to Step 2.
6.1.1 Approximation of the Earnings Process
The accurate approximation as a discrete state process of the continuous state autoregres-
sion in Chapter 1 is important because the characteristics of the earnings process greatly
aﬀect the model’s output regarding the wealth distribution.
The approximation involved two steps. The ﬁrst step involves transforming a yearly
model into the 5-year frequency. This was done by simulating the yearly model and sam-
pling every ﬁfth element to construct the ﬁve year equivalent. The second step involves
the discrete state approximation to this 5-year model. The number of states used in
the approximation is 7. Computational constraints precluded the number to be larger
although it would clearly be desirable.
The Table 6 provides a comparison of moments for zt and ezt, (the income shocks),
and their discrete approximations:
6.2 Data
6.2.1 National Accounting Data
Almost all of the aggregate data comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis website
(www.bea.gov). The only exceptions are the United States population, the average weekly
hours worked and the number of employees in the private sector, all of which come from
25the Bureau of Labor Statistics Website ( www.bls.gov). The data are annual (except when
extracting the Solow residual, see below) starting in 1964 and ending in 2003.
• Gross Domestic Product: Output is deﬁned as Gross Domestic Product minus Con-
sumption Expenditures in Durable Goods minus Expenditures in Housing Services
minus Net Exports minus Government Consumption and Investment Expenditures.
Output was transformed into per capita terms through dividing by the US popula-
tion and transformed into real terms by deﬂating using the GDP deﬂator.
• Investment: Aggregate investment is Total Gross Private Domestic Investment.
Business investment is the sum of non-residential investment in structures, equip-
ment and software. Residential Investment is Total Investment minus Business
Investment.
• Consumption: Consumption is deﬁned as Personal Expenditures in Consumption
minus Expenditures in Durable Goods minus Expenditures in Housing Services.
Investment and Consumption were also deﬂated by the GDP deﬂator and trans-
formed into per capita terms through dividing by the US population.
• Capital Stocks: The stocks of both residential and business capital come from the
Fixed Assets Tables (Current Net-Cost). The deﬁnition of Residential Capital is
Residential Structures. Business capital is deﬁned as Total Private Fixed Assets
minus Residential Structures. Data on residential stocks by tenure (renters vs.
owners) also come from the Fixed Assets Tables.
6.2.2 Wealth Data
Data on the wealth distribution comes from the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
This survey provides information about the wealth composition, income, and demographic
26variables. It is sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board and collected by the National Or-
ganization for Research at the University of Chicago. It is conducted every three years
and its sample size is relatively small, interviewing around 4,500 families.
The SCF oversamples wealthier families, given the high level of concentration of the
wealth in the United States, therefore appropriate weights need to be used to compute
statistics from this dataset. All calculations reported in this paper are weighted averages.
Deﬁnitions of Variables: I have deﬁned variables in the same way as Aizcorbe, Ken-
nickell, and Moore (2003).
• Financial Assets: Instruments in this category include checking accounts, savings
accounts, money market accounts (including the ones in mutual funds), call ac-
counts at brokerage houses, certiﬁcates of deposit, stocks (including stocks at mu-
tual funds), government bonds (including mutual funds), tax free bonds, mortgage-
backed bonds, corporate and foreign bonds , IRAs (and other quasi-liquid retirement
accounts), account type pension plans (including 401(k)’s), life insurance and other
ﬁnancial assets (including among other things cash or royalties).
• Non-Financial Assets: Includes the value of all vehicles, the value of the primary
residence and other real estate participations, vacation homes, net equity in business
at market value, and other non-ﬁnancial assets (such as jewelry, art, rare books,
etc...).
• Debt: Housing debt (which includes debt on primary residence and all other resi-
dential property), credit card debt, other installment loans, loans against pensions,
against life insurance, and any other miscellaneous loans.
• Net Worth: It is deﬁned as Total Assets (ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial) minus Total
Debt.
27